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ABSTRACT 
 
 This study investigated whether research by researchers affiliated with a religious 
academic institution would be seen as of less scientific merit than research done by 
researchers affiliated with a nonreligious academic institution. Such a bias may exist 
given the different value systems underlying religion and science, the widespread 
perception of a conflict between religion and science, and research on differences in 
cognitive styles and stereotypes about religious versus nonreligious people. In this study, 
U.S. participants recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed an online survey, 
which included an abstract of an article describing scientific research with authors’ names 
and academic institutions, and questions on perceived scientific merit, religiosity, 
spirituality, religion as Quest, and perceived conflict between religion and science. There 
was a significant difference in the perceived merit of the researchers, with the group 
believing the researchers were affiliated with a religious academic institution rating the 
research as lower in scientific merit than the group believing the researchers were 
affiliated with a nonreligious academic institution. The perceived level of conflict 
between religion and science was found to moderate the relationship, such that higher 
levels of perceived conflict between religion and science showed a greater difference in 
scientific merit between groups. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In many ways, religion and science seem to emerge from different systems of 
beliefs and values. These systems sometimes complement each other, but are also often 
perceived as being in conflict with one another. A strong proponent of this idea is 
Richard Dawkins, a renowned evolutionary biologist, outspoken atheist, and critic of 
organized religion, who argues that religion is detrimental to science. He states that 
religion “subverts science and saps the intellect,” and that religion prevents individuals 
from truly understanding the world (Dawkins, 2006). The notion of a tension between 
religion and science is also evidenced by the longstanding controversy surrounding the 
extent to which evolution and creationism should be included in education in the U.S., 
with some religious individuals seeking to avoid exposing children to an idea that is 
against their religious beliefs. In fact, there have been public debates about whether 
evolution or creationism is true, most notably the debate between Bill Nye, a scientist and 
popular television personality most known for his children’s series “Bill Nye the Science 
Guy,” and Ken Ham, a Christian fundamentalist and president of Answers in Genesis, a 
“Creationism apologetics organization” (Chappell, 2014). These differences are also 
evidenced by the public’s perception of the relationship between religion and science. In 
a recent poll by Pew Research Center, 59% of Americans said that, in general, they felt 
that science was often in conflict with religion (Funk & Alper, 2015).  
 The goal of the present study is to investigate perceptions of the conflict between 
religion and science and how they might relate to bias within the scientific community. In 
particular, the focus will be on comparing how research conducted by scientists at 
religiously-affiliated versus nonreligious universities is perceived. To the extent that there 
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is a perceived conflict between religion and science, it may be reflected in negative 
evaluations of the scientific work of researchers at religiously-affiliated institutions, 
causing an unjustified bias in publication and reception of the research findings. 
 Part of why religion and science may be perceived as being in conflict comes 
from differences in many of the basic beliefs on which each is based. Some religious 
beliefs, for example, seem to directly contradict widely accepted scientific theories, such 
as beliefs in creationism (i.e., that the world was created by God in seven days) and the 
Big Bang theory and theory of evolution, which provide a conflicting account for how 
intelligent life came to be. Yet, beyond the content of beliefs, there may also be a tension 
between the core values that underlie science and religion.  
Values Underlying Religion 
 One of the main functions of religion is to reduce feelings of uncertainty (Hogg, 
Adelman, & Blagg, 2010; van de Bos, van Ameijde, & van Gorp, 2006;). That is, there 
are things in life that humans do not innately understand, and religion can alleviate 
feelings of uncertainty by providing ideological answers to fundamental life questions, 
and establishes belief systems and practices for everyday life (Hogg et al., 2010). 
Examples of this are explanations for what happens after death, which help reduce the 
uncertainty and fear of death, and explanations for creation, which help reduce the 
uncertainty about where we came from and why we are here. In short, religions “address 
the nature of existence, invoking sacred entities and associated rituals and ceremonies. 
They … provide a moral compass and rules for living that pervade a person’s life, 
making them particularly attractive in times of uncertainty” (Hogg et al., 2010, p. 1).  
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 The uncertainty-reducing function of religion provides insight on some of the 
basic values that underlie religion. One of the most widely accepted psychological 
theories of basic human values comes from the work of Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz, 
1992; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Schwartz defines human values as “desirable goals, 
varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives,” with the crucial 
distinguishing factor between values being the type of motivational goal they express 
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p. 89; Schwartz, 1992). The values he proposed represent 
conscious goals and universal requirements of human existence, that are “needs of 
individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and 
survival and welfare requirements of groups” (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995, p. 89). These 
are summed up in ten basic human values: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, 
self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. Schwartz 
also proposes that all ten human values form a circular structure, with compatible values 
contiguous to each other, and values in opposition with one another located on opposite 
sides of the circle (see Figure 2). For example, power (a value dealing with social 
prestige and control) and achievement (a value dealing with personal success and 
competence) are adjacent to one another and are related to self-enhancement (seeking to 
improve one’s personal place in the social order). In contrast, the values of power and 
achievement are opposite of universalism (a value dealing with understanding, tolerance, 
and protection of the welfare of all) (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). 
 Schwartz and Huismans (1995) conducted a cross-cultural study with samples of 
Israeli Jews, Spanish Roman Catholics, Dutch Calvanist Protestants, and Greek Orthodox 
to investigate specific values that correlate with religion. Participants filled out the World 
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Values Scale developed by Schwartz (which asks participants to rate how important each 
of the ten distinct values is in their life), and also responded to a question asking how 
religious they considered themselves to be. They found that self-reported religiosity 
correlated positively with the values of tradition, conformity, security, and benevolence 
across all samples, regardless of religion and nationality. Notably, three of these 
correlated variables- tradition (defined as “respect, commitment, and acceptance of the 
customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide”), conformity (defined as 
“restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate 
social expectations or norms”), and security (defined as “safety, harmony and stability of 
society, of relationships, and of self”)- share a common emphasis in Schwartz’s theory on 
maintaining traditions and conservative ideas and practices (Schwartz & Huismans, 
1995). Crucially, these values, in particular, might help fulfill epistemic motives that 
correlate with uncertainty-reducing motives tied to religion, by providing a sense of 
security and an adherence to past and present cultural beliefs, practices, and norms (Hall, 
Matz, & Wood, 2010).  
 In a later study Roccas and Schwartz (1997) surveyed participants in six Roman 
Catholic countries in Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal) using an expanded value survey, with the same self-report religiosity item used 
by Schwartz and Huismans. They replicated the finding that higher religiosity correlated 
with higher levels of tradition, conformity, security, and benevolence. Importantly, all of 
these findings by Schwartz and colleagues suggest that the basic values that correlate 
most strongly with religion are not specific to any one particular world religion. 
Values Underlying Science 
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 Whereas religion relies on more supernatural and biblical answers to life 
questions, science relies on logic, critical inquiry, and objectivity. To my knowledge, 
there is no published research examining which of Schwartz’s basic human values 
correspond most strongly with scientific inquiry. Schwartz’s value of self-direction, 
however, aligns with some of the principles that seem central to scientific inquiry. He 
defines self-direction as a value pertaining to independent thought and action-choosing, 
creating, and exploring. In Schwartz’s circular model, self-direction is opposite the values 
of tradition, conformity, and security, supporting the idea that the values underlying 
religion and science may be in opposition. 
 Because science deals strongly with exploration, creativity is key when 
conducting science. For instance, Bronowski (1956) argued that a creative mind is needed 
for scientific advancement, that some of the greatest scientists of all time were highly 
creative, and it was their creativity that enabled them to make such great discoveries. He 
provided Copernicus and Kepler, who creatively looked at the planets and our solar 
system, as examples. In sum, Bronowski argued that a sense of personal exploration is 
essential for the progression of science. The National Academy of Science (1995) also 
argues that scientists use the tools of curiosity and creativity to influence scientific 
discovery. These tools, along with sound judgment, are needed for scientists to perform 
research that meets the rigorous standards for the scientific method. 
 Although there seems to be a consensus that creativity is important in scientific 
advancement, objectivity is also viewed as a vital aspect of scientific inquiry. For 
example, Longino (1990) evaluated arguments regarding value-free science and 
determined that “good” science should be free from personal and social values. In a 
 6 
similar fashion, Kant (1781) argued that scientific knowledge must be objective, and 
independent of the whims of scientists. These ideas illuminate that the objective of 
scientific inquiry should be advancing scientific knowledge with impartiality, whereas 
the objective of religion, which is value-laden, is to follow the word and will of God or a 
higher power. 
 In an article discussing both the value and values of science, Jamieson (2015) 
argues that two of the main constructs that drive science are critical inquiry and 
skepticism. That is, scientists need to continuously critique their methods of inquiry and 
remain skeptical of research findings. One example discussed by Jamieson (2015) is of 
the published research finding that vaccines lead to autism. Although this finding was 
disproven, a large number of people still believe the initial (erroneous) findings. This 
illustrates why scientists need to be skeptical and critical of scientific work, and how 
critical inquiry can help progress science. As summarized by the National Academy of 
Science (1995), “the fallibility of methods is a valuable reminder of the importance of 
skepticism in science. Scientific knowledge and scientific methods, whether old or new, 
must be continually scrutinized for possible errors” (p. 6). 
 Finally, in his writings on the philosophy of science, Karl Popper (1959) also 
examined the idea of deductive (rather than inductive) reasoning as a driving force 
behind science. Inductive inference involves taking an observation (i.e., a singular 
statement) and generalizing it to a theory (i.e., a universal statement). In contrast, 
deductive reasoning starts with a theory, that then informs empirical tests that aim to 
disprove the theory. Inductive logic requires that all statements of science are capable of 
being conclusively decided by both truth and falsity. Statements of science are not 
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accepted dogmatically, they must be justified. Building on Kant’s (1781) notion that a 
scientific principle is objective only if it can be tested and understood, Popper (1959) 
argued that although scientific theories are never fully justifiable or verifiable, they are 
nonetheless testable. To prove a theory true would require making every observation 
without finding one in opposition, whereas falsifying a theory only requires the 
observation of one case contrary to the theory. For example, the theory that all ravens are 
black can be falsified by the simple observation that there are white ravens at the New 
York Zoo (Popper, 1959). He also argued “it must be possible for an empirical scientific 
system to be refuted by experience” (Popper, 1959, p. 41) In other words, Popper argued 
that science should be oriented around the objective of seeking to disprove theories, 
rather than trying to prove them true.  
  To summarize, although there is relatively little empirical work investigating the 
values underlying science within Schwartz’s model of basic life values, insights from the 
philosophy of science and even scientific governing bodies (i.e., the National Academy 
of Science) suggest that Schwartz’s notion of self-direction may be a guiding principle of 
scientific inquiry. Furthermore, there are other basic values, such as skepticism, critical 
inquiry, and objectivity, that inform science and scientific research and that also may 
fulfill aims that are oppositional to those achieved by religion. 
Existence of Perceived Conflict 
 A majority of Americans perceive a conflict between religion and science. 
Specifically, a recent Pew Research Center survey asked Americans if they felt that 
science and religion were “mostly compatible” or “often in conflict” with one another 
(Funk & Alper, 2015). Fifty-nine percent of participants said they felt science and 
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religion were “often in conflict,” whereas only 38% felt science and religion were 
“mostly compatible” (3% responded that they “did not know”). Due to increased media 
coverage of this conflict (i.e., the debate between Bill Nye and Ken Ham), and the 
increased visibility of ideas from Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris (a renowned 
neuroscientist, philosopher, and outspoken atheist), and Andrew Dickson White (a 
historian, educator, and cofounder of Cornell University), Ecklund and Scheitle (2007) 
investigated perceptions of the conflict between religion and science using data from a 
large sample of academic scientists. They analyzed data collected as part of a study of 
Religion Among Academic Scientists (RAAS), which examined the degree of belief in 
God and religious attendance of 1,646 scientists from 21 elite U.S. research universities. 
They found that nearly two-thirds of participants did not believe in God (31.2%) or 
indicated that they did not know if there was a God but felt there was no way of finding 
out (31.0%). They also found that 7.2% believed in a higher power but not a God, 5.4% 
believed in God sometimes, 15.5% had some doubts but did believe in God, and 9.7% 
had no doubt that God exists. They also found that, in the last year, just over half of the 
participants had not attended religious services at all (50.1%). They also found that 1.5% 
of participants attended religious services more than once a week, 7.1% attended once a 
week, 5.8% attended 2 to 3 times a month, 4.3% attended once a month, 4.5% attended 6 
to 11 times per year, and 26.5% attended 1 to 5 times per year. In sum, these data 
indicated that a majority of scientists surveyed did not believe in God and did not attend 
religious services. 
 Using the same RAAS data set, Park and Ecklund (2009) analyzed responses to 
the item “there is an irreconcilable conflict between religious knowledge and scientific 
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knowledge.”  Participants responded on a 5-point scale ranging from disagree to agree, 
but in their analysis Park and Ecklund collapsed this into a dichotomous scale, with agree 
consisting of both agree and somewhat agree, and disagree consisting of both disagree 
and somewhat disagree. In contrast to the poll results from the Pew Research Center 
mentioned above, Park and Ecklund found that a majority (56.9%) of scientists felt there 
was no conflict between science and religion, whereas 36.6% felt there was some level of 
conflict (6.5% had no opinion). Interestingly, although a majority of scientists indicated 
that they did not feel there was a conflict between science and religion, the finding that a 
majority of scientists were not religious believers themselves, points to a potential 
disconnect; whereas academic scientists do not view religion and science as being in 
conflict when explicitly questioned, their own lack of religious beliefs may suggest a 
fundamental tension that they are unable or unwilling to report. 
Why Religious Researchers Might Be Seen as Less Scientific 
 Why might this perception exist? One answer may come from research indicating 
differences in the cognitive processing styles of religious and non-religious individuals. 
For instance, research indicating that religious individuals have a more intuitive cognitive 
style (that is based heavily on one’s intuitions or gut-level cognitive responses) and that 
nonreligious individuals have a more analytic cognitive style (that is characterized by a 
propensity to set aside intuitions when problem solving) (e.g., Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012) may contribute to the belief that individuals who are highly 
religious lack the cognitive skills required for scientific inquiry.  
 Pennycook et al. (2012), for example, found that people who engaged in more 
analytical cognitive processing on a task were more likely to reject religious and 
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supernatural beliefs. In an initial study, a sample of MTurk participants completed two 
tasks designed to measure analytic cognitive style: the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
and a measure of Base-Rate Conflict (BRC). The CRT consists of three mathematical 
problems that elicit an implicit misleading intuition, e.g., “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in 
total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” The intuitive 
response is that the bat costs $1.00 and the ball costs $.10, however, upon further 
contemplation and use of arithmetic (i.e., engaging in analytic cognitive processing), 
many people arrive at the correct answer, which is that the bat costs $1.05 and the ball 
costs $.05. With the BRC, individuals are given base rate information about the 
frequency of certain cases in the population and asked to make a judgment. The judgment 
is designed so that individuals will make an error in judgment if they rely solely on their 
intuitions, such as a stereotype. To arrive at the correct judgment, individuals need to 
override their intuitions and engage in analytical cognitive processing. For example, on 
one item, participants were told 995 out of 1000 people from a fictitious sample were 
nurses and 5 were doctors. They were then told that one person was randomly selected 
from the sample, and that this person lives in a beautiful home in a posh neighborhood, is 
well spoken, and invested in his career. Participants were then asked which is more 
likely: this person is a doctor or this person is a nurse. Intuitively, the description may 
sound more like the life of a doctor than a nurse, but analytically, there is a much higher 
probability that this person is a nurse than a doctor (99.5% versus .5%). Pennycook et al. 
(2012) found a significant negative correlation between level of religiosity (measured 
using the Religious Engagement Scale, the Religious Belief Scale, and a measure of 
belief in God) and degree of analytic cognitive processing. In other words, participants 
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who were higher in religiosity were more likely to rely on intuition and less likely to 
engage in analytical thinking. These findings, which were replicated by Pennycook et al. 
(2012) in a follow-up study, are important because they identify a cognitive difference 
between religious and non-religious individuals that may be salient to the public, and, as 
a result, may contribute to the perceived conflict between science and religion. 
 Other research by Shenhav et al. (2012) found that MTurk participants who gave 
more intuitive answers on a Cognitive Reflection Test reported a stronger belief in God 
(on a scale ranging from confident atheist to confident believer). In a second study, they 
had participants take an online survey that employed the same belief in God scale as 
Study 1, as well as the previously used Cognitive Reflection Test. Replicating the results 
of Study 1, they found that more intuitive responses on these tests were significantly 
positively correlated with belief in God. Together, the findings of Pennycook et al. (2012) 
and Shenhav et al. (2012) identify a cognitive difference between religious and non-
religious individuals that may influence people’s perceptions of the compatibility 
between religion and science. 
 Another basis for the perception of a conflict between religion and science may be 
due to commonly held stereotypes about religious and non-religious individuals. Ehlrich 
and Van Tubergen (1971) investigated stereotypes about atheists, a group who, by 
definition, are nonreligious. In a study with 91 undergraduate participants, they found 
that the strongest positive stereotypes for atheists were that they were skeptical, critical, 
and scientifically minded. Caldwell-Harris and colleagues also found that atheists are 
seen as being logical, rational, and intellectual (Caldwell-Harris, Wilson, LoTempio, & 
Beit-Hallahmi, 2011). These stereotypes are all highly related to values underlying 
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science, so it stands to reason that atheists may be perceived as better able to conduct 
rigorous scientific research, and, by implication, people who are the opposite of atheists 
(i.e., highly religious individuals) may be perceived as less able to conduct scientific 
research. 
 Other research by Saroglou, Yzerbyt, and Kaschten (2011) found that religious 
individuals were seen as being more dogmatic than nonreligious individuals. In an online 
study, they asked participants whether they considered themselves a religious believer or 
non-believer, and then split participants into two groups on the basis of their response. 
Participants were then asked the extent to which they felt members of the opposite group 
(believers or non-believers) were characterized by 24 attributes, including honesty, 
impulsivity, altruism, conservatism, dogmatism, hedonism, competence, and 
extraversion. They found that religious believers were seen as being significantly more 
dogmatic and altruistic than non-believers, and that non-believers were seen as being 
more impulsive and generally competent than believers. This helps strengthen the idea 
that stereotypes may contribute to a perceived conflict between religion and science. 
 Additionally, in a series of two studies by Rios, Cheng, Totton, and Shariff 
(2015), Christians were seen as less competent in science by both Christian and non-
Christian participants, and when this stereotype was made salient to participants in an 
experimental context, Christians underperformed on science-related tasks. Specifically, in 
Study 1, MTurk participants provided their religious affiliation and then rated four 
different groups (atheists, Christians, Jews, and Muslims) on how competent they felt 
each group was, compared to the average person, on overall competence, competence in 
science, trust in science, and warmth. They found that Christians were rated as 
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significantly lower in scientific competence than other groups and that atheists were rated 
as significantly higher in scientific competence than other groups. 
 In Study 2, participants in a lab study were randomly assigned to read a fictitious 
article saying that a majority of people felt Christians were bad at science (a high-threat 
group), that a majority of people felt Christians were good at science (low-threat group), 
or read no article at all (control group). Participants then filled out a 20-item self-report 
measure of their identification with science (e.g., “I am quite good at science.”). They 
found that Christian participants reported significantly lower levels of scientific 
identification than non-Christian participants in the high-threat group, but that no 
significant difference emerged between Christian and non-Christian participants in the 
low-threat and no article (control) groups. One explanation for these findings is that if 
religious individuals are seen as relatively poor at science, it may be assumed that their 
decreased capacity for science is due to a conflict between the skills and values 
underlying scientific inquiry and their religious beliefs. 
 In conclusion, both actual (observed) differences in cognitive processing style and 
stereotypes about individuals who are highly religious and not religious at all (i.e., 
atheists) may play a role in the perception of a conflict between religion and science, and 
cognitive styles and stereotypes may even influence each other. 
Subtle Bias in Evaluations of Intellectual Merit 
 The present research will build on classic findings in social psychology pertaining 
to evaluations of intelligence (e.g., Amabile, 1981; Goldberg, 1968). One study comes 
from the research by Goldberg (1968), who investigated the idea that men are seen as 
being more knowledgeable and competent in professional work than women. He had a 
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sample of female college students read excerpts of professional articles. Based on random 
assignment, participants were led to believe that the excerpts had been written by either a 
female author or a male author. Crucially, across the two conditions, participants read 
identical article excerpts. Goldberg then had participants rate the article excerpts on 
value, persuasiveness, and profundity, as well as rate the author on writing style, 
professional competence, professional status, and ability to sway the reader. Ratings of 
the excerpts and author were higher for almost all of the evaluative dimensions when 
participants were told the author was male rather than female. This illuminated the 
internalization of negative stereotypes about women’s intelligence by women, 
themselves. Relevant to the present research, it also introduced a novel paradigm for 
evaluating perceptions of intelligence and competence in a subtle way. 
 Drawing on a similar methodology, Amabile (1981) explored perceptions of 
intelligence, ability, and competency. Specifically, participants in the study were asked to 
read excerpts from a book review in which a fictitious reviewer either gave the book a 
negative or positive review. Participants were asked to rate the reviewer on literary 
expertise, intelligence, competence as an editor, kindness, career success, self-
confidence, fairness, and likeability. Amabile found that participants rated the reviewer 
who gave negative feedback as more intelligent and competent and higher in expertise 
than the reviewer who gave positive feedback. The conclusion was that negative 
reviewers were seen as being more intelligent, but less kind, or in other words, they were 
seen as being “brilliant, but cruel.” Interestingly, the findings from Amabile’s study 
might indirectly shed light on why religious individuals might be seen as less competent 
at science. Because much of religion revolves around “loving thy neighbor” and treating 
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others kindly, it may be that religious people are seen as being less capable of giving 
harsh criticism than non-religious people. This would imply, given the findings of 
Amabile, that religious people would be perceived as less intelligent and less competent 
at intellectual tasks like scientific research. Taken together, the research by Goldberg 
(1968) and Amabile (1981) helped introduce a research paradigm that has been effective 
for assessing perceptions of intelligence or competence, and, importantly, how such 
perceptions might vary based on participants’ beliefs about others. 
Present Research 
 In summary, previous research sheds light on the existence of a perceived conflict 
between the basic values underlying religion and science, which may lead to a disparity 
in perceived quality and merit of scientific research conducted by scientists affiliated with 
religious academic institutions versus nonreligious institutions. The goal of the present 
study is to investigate the perceived conflict further, and how it may shape perceptions of 
scientific merit in the context of psychological research. Specifically, I will explore two 
related research questions: 
1. To what extent is religious identification perceived as reflecting a 
decreased capacity for scientific rigor? 
2. How might this belief influence perceptions of the quality of scholarly 
scientific work? 
My primary hypothesis is that research conducted by scientists at an academic institution 
with an explicit religious affiliation will be viewed as less rigorous and lower in scientific 
merit than research conducted by scientists at an (ostensibly) nonreligious academic 
institution.   
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 Additionally, I will test a series of exploratory hypotheses involving potential 
moderating variables that might shed further light on why this lesser view of merit might 
exist. It is possible that participants’ own levels of religiosity and approach to religion 
(e.g., being spiritual (versus religious), viewing religion as a process of questioning and 
re-examination, (i.e., quest orientation; Batson, 1976)), education level, and extent of 
perceived conflict between religion and science might moderate the primary hypothesis. 
For instance, it is possible that perceptions of a decreased capacity for rigorous science 
among religious scientists might be weaker among participants who are, themselves, 
relatively high in religiosity, because religious scientists may be viewed as ingroup 
members and may therefore be viewed more favorably, in general. Or, highly religious 
participants might feel that their own religious beliefs do not conflict with their 
knowledge and understanding of science, and may thus draw on their evaluations of 
themselves when rating the scientific abilities of similar (religious) others.  
 It is also possibe that participants’ level of spirituality, as a construct that is 
distinct from religiosity, may moderate the primary hypothesis. It is unclear whether there 
will be a stronger or weaker effect among participants who are relatively high in 
spirituality, in part because individuals who are high in spirituality may consider 
themselves to be highly religious and highly spiritual or, alternatively, may consider 
themselves to be highly spiritual but not religious. Potential moderation by spirituality 
may be especially informative because it may provide insight into a slightly different 
aspect of religiosity. Relatedly, the term quest orientation describes a more self-directive 
approach to religion and spirituality. That is, individuals who are high in quest orientation 
view religion as a process of questioning and re-examination (Batson, 1976). Although 
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religious, the way in which individuals high in quest orientation experience their 
religiosity may lead them to perceive religiously-affiliated scientists in a very different 
way. This potential moderation will be especially informative due to the overlap of quest 
orientation with the self-directive nature of science. 
 Another potential moderator is participants’ education level. Previous research 
has found that higher levels of education correlate with more frequent attendance at 
religious services (Glaeser & Sacerdote, 2002) within the general population. Assuming 
that more frequent attendance correlates with higher levels of religiosity, it seems that 
more educated, and thus more religious, participants may view religious researchers as a 
more favorable ingroup. Finally, it seems likely that the degree to which participants 
perceive a conflict between religion and science will moderate the primary hypothesized 
relationship, such that there will be a stronger effect among participants who view the 
values underlying religion and the values underlying science as conflicting. 
 To summarize, I will explore the following hypotheses in a set of post-hoc 
moderator analyses: 
1. Participants’ level of religiosity will moderate the relationship predicted in 
the primary hypothesis, such that there will be a weaker effect among 
participants relatively high in religiosity. 
2. Participants’ level of spirituality will moderate the relationship predicted 
in the primary hypothesis; however, it is unclear whether there will be a 
stronger or weaker effect among participants who are relatively high in 
spirituality. 
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3. Participants’ level of quest orientation will moderate the relationship 
predicted in the primary hypothesis, such that there will be a weaker effect 
among participants who are relatively high in Quest orientation.  
4. Participants’ education level will moderate the relationship predicted in 
the primary hypothesis, such that there will be a stronger effect among 
participants with relatively low levels of education.  
5. The degree to which participants perceive a conflict between religion and 
science will moderate the relationship predicted in the primary hypothesis, 
such that there will be a stronger effect among participants who view the 
values underlying religion and the values underlying science as 
conflicting. 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
Five hundred and one adults (45.7% male, 53.1% female) participated in the study 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk, and were paid $0.40. Participants ranged in age from 
19 to 82 years old (M = 38.01, SD = 12.94). The sample was predominantly (91.8%) non-
Hispanic/non-Latino, with the following racial composition: 79.2% White/Caucasian, 
8.4% Black/African American, 7.4% Asian, 1.0% American Indian or Alaska Native, 
2.2% Multiracial, 1.6% other, and .2% race not reported. Participants indicated the 
following religious affiliations: 24.0% Protestant, 22.4% Catholic, 3.0% Jewish, 1.4% 
Mormon, 1.6% Buddhist, 2.4% Islamic, .8% Hindu, .2% Nontrinitarian, 10.6% religious 
or spiritual with no religious affiliation, 27.3% neither religious nor spiritual, and 6.2% 
other. Descriptive information for all the key variables is shown in Table 1. 
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Procedure 
 
 First, participants viewed an abstract from a published study in the area of 
developmental psychology. The specific article was chosen because it was a peer-
reviewed publication that might elicit, on average, a moderate level of perceived 
scientific merit and a sufficient level of variability between participants in perceived 
scientific merit. This area of research seemed more ideal for purposes of this study than a 
study in the area of neuroscience or physiology, for example, which might result in a 
ceiling effect for perceived scientific merit in a non-academic sample. Because many 
participants might be unfamiliar with norms surrounding the reporting of information in 
academic publications, just before viewing the abstract, all participants read the following 
information:  
 “In the first stage of this study, you will view the first page of a research 
paper published in a scientific journal. Essential components of the first page of 
scientific papers include: the title of the paper, displayed in bold font at the top 
of the page, the first initial and last name of each of the authors who wrote the 
paper, the academic institution (i.e., college or university) at which the research 
was conducted by the authors and their research team, and an abstract, which is 
a brief summary of the key elements of the research conducted by the authors 
and their findings the opening paragraphs of the introduction of the paper.” 
 
 They were then instructed to read through the title, names of authors, the 
academic institution of the authors, and abstract carefully. The title and abstract of a 
published study on infants’ attention to visual cues were presented, however, participants 
were provided with fictitious information about the names of the authors and the 
academic institution at which the research had been conducted. Specifically, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions: a religious condition (in 
which participants were informed the authors were affiliated with a religious university) 
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and a non-religious condition (in which participants were informed the authors were 
affiliated with a (presumably) non-religious university). Manipulation checks were then 
employed to make sure participants paid attention to the title of the paper, the academic 
institution of the researchers, and the general topic of the research. As the key dependent 
measure, participants were then asked to rate the scientific merit of the research and 
expertise of the researchers. 
 Participants were next asked to report demographic information, as well as answer 
questions about their religious affiliation, church attendance, and belief in God, and a 
series of established scales that assessed a range of aspects of degree of religiosity and 
spirituality. Finally, participants were asked to what extent they felt there was a conflict 
between the values of science and the values of religion. 
Measures 
 Religious affiliation manipulation. Based on random assignment, participants 
were led to believe that the study discussed in the abstract was either performed by 
researchers at a (fictitious) academic institution with an explicit religious affiliation 
(North Baker Christian University) or an ostensibly nonreligious academic institution 
(North Baker University). 
 Perceived scientific merit. To measure perceptions of the scientific merit of the 
research, participants completed a 9-item scale using items from the National Science 
Foundation Grant Review Manual, along with additional items that were created for this 
study (e.g., “To what extent is this research of high quality?” “To what extent does this 
research successfully measure what it claims to measure?” “How knowledgeable do you 
think the researchers who wrote the paper are in their field of study?”; measured using a 
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9-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely). Due to the high internal reliability (α 
= .93) of the items assessing perceived scientific merit, a composite variable was created 
by averaging participants’ scores on the nine items. This item was used for the analyses. 
 Manipulation Checks. Three multiple-choice questions asking participants to 
recall the title of the research paper, the academic institution of the authors, and the 
general topic of the research presented in the abstract were included as checks on 
participants’ attention to the key experimental information. These questions appeared 
immediately after the experimental manipulation. For the attention check on article title, 
participants were asked to identify the article’s title from the following options: “Positive 
Emotions Trigger Upward Spirals Toward Emotional Well-being,” “Adults’ Eyes Trigger 
Shifts of Visual Attention in Human Infants,” “Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of 
Deferred Decision,” or “The Development of Depression in Children and Adolescents.” 
For the attention check on general research topic, participants were asked to identify the 
general topic of the article from the following options: Infants’ visual attention, Adult 
decision-making, or Language learning in adolescents. For the attention check on 
religious versus nonreligious academic institution, participants in the religious condition 
were asked to identify the authors’ academic affiliation from the following options: North 
Baker Christian University, South Barber Christian University, or East Banes Christian 
University. Participants in the nonreligious condition were asked to identify the authors’ 
academic affiliation from the following options: North Baker University, South Barber 
University, or East Banes University. 
 Demographic Information. Demographic variables including participants’ age, 
gender, ethnicity, race, education level, academic field of study (when relevant), e.g., 
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college major, political affiliation, political ideology (liberalism vs. conservatism) on 
social issues and economic issues, religious affiliation, and attendance at a religiously-
affiliated educational institution were measured. 
 Centrality of Religion Scale. The Centrality of Religion Scale (Huber & Huber, 
2012) was used to measure participants’ level of religiosity. The scale consists of 14 
items (α = .97) measuring the importance, or centrality, of religion in one’s life (e.g., 
“How often do you think about religious issues?” “How important is it to take part in 
religious services?”; measured using a 5-point scale ranging from not at all to very 
much/extremely). Given that these items were sufficiently reliable, a composite score for 
this variable was created by averaging participants’ scores on each of the individual scale 
items. 
 Spirituality. Three items (α = .98) were used to measure participants’ level of 
spirituality (e.g., “To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person?”; measured 
using a 9-point scale ranging from not at all to extremely). Given the high reliability of 
these items, a composite score was created for each individual by averaging their scores 
on each individual item. 
 Religion as Quest. The 6-item Religion as Quest Scale (Batson, 1976; α = .71) 
was used to measure the degree to which religion is used as a means to better understand 
oneself and the world (e.g., “My religious development has emerged out of my growing 
sense of personal identity” “Questions are far more central to my religious experience 
than are answers”; measured using a 9-point scale ranging from strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). Given that these items were sufficiently reliable, after reverse-scoring 
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appropriate items, a composite score for this variable was created by averaging 
participants’ scores on each of the individual scale items. 
 Perceived conflict between religion and science. To measure perceived conflict 
between religion and science, participants were asked, “To what extent do you feel there 
is a conflict between the values of science and the values of religion?,” with responses 
measured on a 7-point scale ranging from no conflict at all to high degree of conflict. 
Results 
 Sixty participants who failed the key manipulation check question about the name 
of the authors’ academic institution were excluded from the analyses. The number of 
excluded cases for the religious academic institution condition (N = 30) and nonreligious 
academic institution condition (N = 30) were identical, so analysis proceeded without any 
corrections for excluded cases. The final sample size used for the analyses reported below 
was N = 441. 
 To investigate differences in the perceived scientific merit of the research for 
participants in the religious versus nonreligious institution condition, an independent 
samples t-test was performed. In support of the primary hypothesis, the perceived 
scientific merit of the research was rated as significantly lower when the researchers who 
conducted it were ostensibly at a religious academic institution (M = 6.38, SD = 1.17) 
than when the researchers were ostensibly at a nonreligious institution (M = 6.61, SD = 
1.07), t(439) = 2.14, p = .03, η2 = .01. 
 Separate moderation analyses were performed to investigate whether the relation 
between religious affiliation and perceived scientific merit was moderated by 
participants’ degree of religiosity, spirituality, Quest orientation, education level, and 
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perceived conflict between scientific and religious values. That is, a series of regression 
models were tested with religious versus non-religious institution (coded as religious 
institution = 1, non-religious institution = 0), each moderator (mean centered), and their 
interaction term as predictors of perceived scientific merit. The only variable found to 
significantly moderate the relation between religious versus non-religious institution and 
perceptions of scientific merit was perceived conflict between scientific and religious 
values. In this regression model a significant main effect for authors’ academic institution 
was found, such that participants who believed the researchers were affiliated with a 
religious institution perceived the research as having lower scientific merit than the 
participants who believed the researchers were affiliated with a nonreligious institution, b 
= -0.27, SE = 0.11, t(399) = -2.41, p = .02. This, however, was qualified by the 
interaction between perceived conflict and religious affiliation condition, b = -0.14, SE = 
0.06, t(399) = -2.37, p = .02. Simple slopes were tested at low (-1 SD below the mean), 
moderate (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean) levels of perceived conflict. At 
moderate and high levels of perceived conflict there was a significant negative 
association between religious institution condition and perceived scientific merit, 
indicating that research conducted by authors at a religious institution was more strongly 
related to perceived scientific merit at high levels of perceived conflict (b = -0.54, SE = 
0.16, t(399) = -3.38, p < .001) than for moderate levels of perceived conflict (b = -0.27, 
SE = 0.11, t(399) = -2.41, p = .02). In contrast, there was no significant association 
between religious institution condition and perceived scientific merit at low levels of 
conflict (b = -0.003, SE = 0.16, t(399) = -0.02, p = .98). 
Discussion 
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 In this study, an abstract discussing research on infants’ cognition was perceived 
as significantly lower in scientific merit when participants believed that the researchers 
who conducted it were affiliated with a religious versus a (presumably) nonreligious 
academic institution. This finding suggests that perceptual biases, potentially rooted in 
people’s beliefs about the capacity of highly religious individuals to engage in scientific 
reasoning, might influence the way scientific research is being perceived by the general 
public. 
 Degree of perceived conflict between religion and science significantly moderated 
the effect of religious versus nonreligious academic affiliation on perceived scientific 
merit, such that higher levels of perceived conflict correlated with lower perceived 
scientific merit of religious researchers’ work. This finding indicates that this form of 
bias against researchers at religious institutions is only evident among individuals who 
perceive moderate and higher levels of conflict between religion and science. In other 
words, researchers’ affiliation with a religious academic institution does not affect how 
individuals think about and perceive the research when they do not perceive a conflict 
between religion and science. Unexpectedly, none of the other proposed moderators 
(religiosity, spirituality, quest orientation, education level) were significant. 
 Although it stands to reason that individuals’ own level of religiosity	might 
impact the extent to which the work of researchers at religious institutions might be 
viewed as lower in scientific quality, the absence of a moderation effect may be 
explained by the findings of Goldberg (1968). He found that, despite the expectation that 
women would rate work by their own gender as higher or at least equal to males in terms 
of intelligence and competence, they actually rated males as higher in intelligence and 
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competence. This suggested that they had internalized the stereotype that men produce 
superior professional work than women, and a similar internalization may be evident in 
the findings from the current study. Although it was expected that religious individuals 
would rate the scientific merit of research done by religiously-affiliated researchers as 
equal to (or even higher than) that by researchers at institutions with no religious 
affiliation, religious participants may have prescribed to the stereotype that religious 
individuals are poor at science, and thus do less meritorious scientific work. 
 As shown in Table 3, bivariate correlations revealed that spirituality and 
religiosity had a significant positive correlation that was high in strength (r = .88, p < 
.001), quest and religiosity had a significant positive correlation that was moderate in 
strength (r = .49, p < .001), and spirituality and quest had a significant positive 
correlation that was moderate in strength (r = .46, p < .01). In other words, in this study, 
there seemed to be evidence that the measures assessing religiosity, spirituality, and quest 
were tapping into overlapping constructs, based on the significance and magnitude of 
these bivariate correlations. Given the lack of significant moderation by religiosity, it is 
not surprising, then, that moderation effects for spirituality and quest were similarly 
nonsignificant. 
 Why might participants’ own level of education fail to moderate of the primary 
effect? A potentially relevant research finding is that education level and religiosity are 
often found to be positively correlated. For example, positive correlations have been 
found between education level and frequency of church attendance, as an indicator of 
religiosity, in large sets of national survey data. To investigate the correlation between 
education and religion, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2002) analyzed data from the 1998 
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General Social Survey and data from the 1981-2001 World Values Survey waves. In both 
sets of data they found a significant positive correlation between education level 
(measured by participants’ highest degree earned) and frequency of church attendance. 
This, in fact, was the case in the present study, although the magnitude of the relationship 
was small (r = .13, p < .01). The positive correlation between education level and church 
attendance may partially explain why, in the present study, participants’ level of 
education did not emerge as a significant moderator. That is, if those with higher levels of 
education attend religious services more often, a reasonable inference is that they are also 
more religious than those with lower levels of education. Given the lack of moderation by 
religiosity in the present data, it may not be surprising that education level was not a 
significant moderator either. Interestingly, however, education level and religiosity were 
unrelated in this study (r = .04, p = .42), despite a large significant positive correlation 
between church attendance and religiosity (r = .71, p < .01). Examination of the bivariate 
relations among these exploratory variables alone arguably leaves a number of questions 
unanswered. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Despite the present findings, the study did have a few noteworthy limitations that 
highlight directions for future research. First, this study looked only at perceptions of 
research conducted at a hypothetical Christian versus a non-religious academic 
institution, and thus did not examine perceptions of other (non-Christian) religions. Yet, 
there is some evidence to suggest that there are certain connotations associated with the 
word Christian. Christians are often seen as being more conservative (Ericson, 2002; 
Schumaker-Matos, 2012), and it may be that perceptions of conservative ideology might 
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explain the ratings of decreased merit among researchers at a Christian university. Also, 
as mentioned previously, the findings of Rios et al. (2015) demonstrated that Christians, 
in particular, are perceived as being poor at science. These connotations and stereotypes 
may not be associated with other world religions, and may have influenced the specific 
findings of this study. Relatedly, there are also differing perceptions of Christians that 
vary by religious branch or sect, and participants may have been thinking of a specific 
sect, rather than Christianity, overall, when participating in this study. An important 
direction for future research is thus to investigate the extent to which the present findings 
replicate when comparing researchers at academic institutions affiliated with various 
other world religions (Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, etc.), or various specific Christian sects 
(Catholicism, Protestantism, Mormonism, etc.), to researchers at nonreligious institutions. 
 This study was also limited to a U.S. sample, although the perceived conflict 
between religion and science appears to be prevalent in other parts of the world as well. 
A poll by the Pew Research Center found that a large majority of individuals in Greece, 
Serbia, Croatia, and the Czech Republic reported they felt there was conflict between 
religion and science (“Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern 
Europe,” 2017). Historical examples from other countries, such as differences between 
scientists and churches in astronomical views, also suggest that this perceived conflict is 
not unique to the U.S. (Robinson, 1999). For example, in ancient Babylon priests and 
astronomers conflicted on whether lunar eclipses were based on time intervals or the 
restlessness of the gods. Also, Galileo and the Roman Catholic Church in Italy contended 
on the movement of planets in the solar system. Based on this, future research could seek 
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to replicate the findings in this study using cross-cultural samples. This could help shed 
light on whether this is a more global phenomenon, or if it is limited to views in the U.S.  
 It would also be helpful to investigate the effect using a sample of academic 
scientists from various STEM fields, to see if their perceptions differ (based on the results 
of Park & Ecklund) from those held by the adult respondents on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, who represent a range of education and disciplinary backgrounds that is more 
representative of the general public, and to see if any differences between fields exists. 
Fellow scientists are the ones whose perceptions of scientific merit primarily determine 
whether or not research findings are accepted as valid and are ultimately published, so it 
would be important to determine if this same effect exists for them, or solely in the 
general population. Due to the nature of scientific inquiry, which is structured around the 
process of peer-review, if high quality and methodologically-sound research has a 
decreased likelihood of being published simply due to bias against researchers at 
religious academic institutions, this bias may be inhibiting potential advancements in 
scientific knowledge. 
 Furthermore, this study only looked at potential scientific merit of research, but 
not necessarily to the point that research could be prevented from being published due to 
a bias against researchers at religiously-affiliated institutions. Another avenue of future 
research could extend the impact by looking at pseudo-behavioral dependent variables, 
with participants being asked to make a decision regarding whether to accept or reject a 
manuscript by a religious versus non-religious researcher. The same manipulation could 
be employed as in this study, but participants could also be given a brief explanation of 
publication guidelines, and then asked if they would accept the research for publication in 
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a scientific journal. Individuals may see scientific research conducted at a religiously-
affiliated institution as less meritorious, but this may or may not be a large enough 
difference to also justify refusing publication.  
 Overall, the implication of this research is that awareness needs to be raised of 
this bias so as to not hinder scientific knowledge and advancement. Researchers should 
be informed that scientific findings should be based solely on the merit of the findings 
and the integrity of the research methods used. Also, it would be helpful to establish more 
widespread and standardized blind review processes, across all scientific fields, for both 
journal and grant reviews, in terms of what information is conveyed to reviewers about 
the researchers and their institutional affiliations. This could also help limit publication 
and funding biases against religiously-affiliated academic institutions. 
 Finally, a methodological limitation stemmed from the multiple-choice options 
for the manipulation check on the researchers’ academic institution. Participants in the 
religious academic institution condition were asked to identify the correct academic 
affiliation from a list of three universities that all had the word “Christian” in the name, 
whereas participants in the nonreligious academic institution condition were given a list 
of three universities in which none had the word “Christian” in the name. It would have 
been helpful to include both “North Baker University” and “North Baker Christian 
University” as options for both conditions, to differentiate participants whose correct 
identification of “North Baker Christian University” was based solely on the recognition 
of “North Baker” from participants who correctly identified both “North Baker” and 
“Christian” in the name. That is, participants who did not remember that “Christian” was 
part of the university name could have still “passed” the attention check in the religious 
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condition, and thus represents a methodological flaw that should be addressed in future 
studies. 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, recent worldwide polls have shed light on the existence of a 
perceived conflict between religion and science. The findings from the present study also 
provide evidence of a perceived conflict between religion and science, due to the 
difference in perceived scientific merit between research conducted by researchers at 
religiously-affiliated versus nonreligious academic institutions. More research should be 
done to further investigate this effect but, in the meantime, awareness needs to be raised 
among academics in the scientific community. 
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January 10, 2018 
  
Dear Participant:  
  
We are researchers in the School of Social & Behavioral Sciences at Arizona 
State University.  
  
We are interested in people’s evaluations of research conducted in academic settings. We 
are inviting your participation, which involves reading an overview of a specific study 
published in a scientific journal and answering questions about your perceptions of the 
research. You will also be asked to provide some basic demographic information. 
 
This is an online study that takes approximately 10-12 minutes to complete. In return for 
participating in the survey, you will be paid $0.40. 
   
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can skip questions if you wish. If you 
choose not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, there will be no 
penalty. You must be 18 years old or older to participate in this study.  
  
Although there is no direct benefit of participating in this study, there is the potential for 
you to gain a better understanding of the process of conducting psychological 
research. There are no foreseeable risks or discomforts to your participation. 
  
The responses you provide in this study will be anonymous—that is, the researchers can 
in no way link the responses you provide in the study to any personally identifying 
information including computer IP address or geographic location. The only record of 
your participation will be in the form of your randomly-generated study completion code, 
which will allow MTurk to process your payment upon study completion. The results 
of this study may be used in reports, presentations, or publications but your name will 
not be known. All data collected in this study will be reported in aggregate form.  
  
If you have any questions concerning this research study, please contact the research 
team at: d.hall@asu.edu / (602) 543-2382. If you have any questions about your rights as 
participant in this research, or if you feel you have been placed at risk, you can contact 
the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at Arizona State University, 
through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. 
  
Sincerely, 
Deborah Hall, Ph.D. 
Erik Porter, B.S. 
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Instructions 
 
In the first stage of this study, you will view the first page of a research paper published 
in a scientific journal. Essential components of the first page of scientific papers 
include:   the title of the paper, displayed in bold font at the top of the page the first initial 
and last name of each of the authors who wrote the paper the academic institution (i.e., 
college or university) at which the research was conducted by the authors and their 
research team an abstract, which is a brief summary of the key elements of the research 
conducted by the authors and their findings the opening paragraphs of the introduction of 
the paper 
 
As you view the research paper, you should read and pay close attention to the first four 
components listed above. That is, you should carefully read the title of the paper, 
the authors' names, the academic institution of the research team, and the abstract. In a 
later stage of this study, you will be asked to recall these key elements of the paper. 
 
You are not expected to be an expert or even knowledgeable in the area of research the 
paper describes. Regardless of what your background in scientific research is, please do 
your best to read through and attend to the key elements of the paper. 
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Religious-Affiliated Abstract 
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Nonreligious-Affiliated Abstract 
 
 
 
 
Demographics 
 
1. What is your age in years? 
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2. What is your gender? 
 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
 
4. What is your racial background? 
 
5. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? 
 
6. What area did you study in school? Or, what would you consider to be the primary 
focus of your studies? 
 
7. What categorization best describes your political affiliation? 
 
8. How would you describe your political orientation on social issues? 
 
9. How would you describe your political orientation on economic issues? 
 
10. What is your religious affiliation? 
 
11. How often do you attend church or religious services? 
 
12. What are your views about the existence of God? 
 
Perceived Scientific Merit Scale 
 
Not at All        Slightly        Somewhat        Very Much        Extremely High Degree 
           1          2        3         4           5           6            7           8                  9 
 
1. To what extent does this research advance knowledge and understanding within a 
scientific field? 
 
2. To what extent is this research of high quality? 
 
3. To what extent is this research well-reasoned, well-organized, and based on sound 
rationale? 
 
4. To what extent does this research successfully measure what it claims to measure? 
 
5. How knowledgeable do you think the researchers who wrote the paper are in their field 
of study? 
 
6. To what extent are the conclusions drawn from the findings warranted? 
 
7. How well designed was this study? 
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8. To what extent were the procedures accurate and appropriate? 
 
9. What amount of confidence do you have that these research findings are true and 
accurate? 
 
Centrality of Religion Scale 
 
Not at All    Moderately    Very Much/Extremely 
   1               2                  3               4                          5 
 
1. How often do you think about religious issues? 
 
2. To what extent do you believe that God or something divine exists?  
 
3. How often do you pray? 
 
4. How interested are you in learning more about religious topics? 
 
5. To what extent do you believe in an afterlife—e.g. immortality of the soul, resurrection 
of the dead or reincarnation? 
 
6. How important is it to take part in religious services? 
 
7. How important is personal prayer for you?  
 
8. How often do you keep yourself informed about religious questions through radio, 
television, internet, newspapers, or books? 
 
9. In your opinion, how probable is it that a higher power really exists? 
 
10. How important is it for you to be connected to a religious community? 
 
11. How often do you pray spontaneously when inspired by daily situations? 
 
12. How often do you experience situations in which you have the feeling that God or 
something divine is present? 
 
13. How often do you experience situations in which you have the feeling that God or 
something divine wants to communicate or to reveal something to you? 
 
14. How often do you experience situations in which you have the feeling that God or 
something divine intervenes in your life? 
 
Spirituality Items 
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Not at All        Slightly        Somewhat        Very Much        Extremely High Degree 
           1          2        3         4           5           6            7           8                  9 
 
1. To what extent do you consider yourself a spiritual person? 
 
2. To what extent is spirituality important to you? 
 
3. To what extent does spirituality contribute to your life? 
 
Religion as Quest Scale 
 
Strongly Disagree      Somewhat  Disagree      Neither Agree nor Disagree   
                       1                2                  3                   4                      5                         6                
Somewhat Agree          Strongly Agree 
        7              8                9 
 
1. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. 
 
2. I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years. 
 
3. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the 
tensions in my world and in my relation to my world. 
 
4. My religious development has emerged out of my growing sense of personal identity. 
 
5. God wasn’t very important to me until I began to ask questions about the meaning of 
my own life. 
 
6. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers. 
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive statistics of Demographics 
 
Participant Age (Years) M (SD) 38.01 (12.94) 
   Participant Gender Male (%) 229 (45.7) 
 
Female (%) 266 (53.1) 
 
Prefer not to answer (%) 1 (0.2) 
 
Other 3 (0.6) 
   Participant Ethnicity Hispanic/Latino (%) 39 (7.8) 
 
Non-Hispanic/ Non-
Latino (%) 460 (91.8) 
   Participant Race Wite (%) 397 (79.2) 
 
Black/African American 
(%) 42 (8.4) 
 
American Indian or 
Alaska Native (%) 5 (1.0) 
 
Asian (%) 37 (7.4) 
 
Multiracial (%) 11 (2.2) 
 
Other (%) 8 (1.6) 
   
Participant Education Level 
Some or No High School 
(%) 1 (0.2) 
 
High School Degree or 
GED (%) 51 (10.2) 
 
Some College/2-Year 
College Degree (%) 151 (30.1) 
 
4-Year College Degree 
(%) 194 (38.7) 
 
Some Graduate School 17 (3.4) 
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(%) 
 
Master's Degree (%) 61 (12.2) 
 
PhD or Professional 
Degree (%) 17 (3.4) 
   
Participant Area of Study 
Physical or Life Science 
(%) 62 (12.4) 
 
Social Science (%) 57 (11.4) 
 
Math/Statistics (%) 21 (4.2) 
 
Business (%) 94 (18.8) 
 
Humanities (%) 42 (8.4) 
 
English (%) 41 (8.2) 
 
Arts (%) 50 (10.0) 
 
Computer Science/IT (%) 71 (14.2) 
 
Other (%) 62 (12.4) 
   Participant Political Affiliation Strong Republican (%) 35 (7.0) 
 
Moderate Republican (%) 45 (9.0) 
 
Weak Republican (%) 37 (7.4) 
 
Strong Democrat (%) 96 (19.2) 
 
Moderate Democrat (%) 83 (16.6) 
 
Weak Democrat (%) 49 (9.8) 
 
Independent (closer to 
Republican than 
Democrat) (%) 33 (6.6) 
 
Independent (closer to 
Democrat than 
Republican) (%) 55 (11.0) 
 
Independent (with no 
leaning toward 
Republican or Democrat) 52 (10.4) 
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(%) 
 
Other (%) 10 (2.0) 
 
Prefer not to answer (%) 5 (1.0) 
   Political Ideology (Social) Extremely Liberal (%) 99 (19.8) 
 
Moderately Liberal (%) 104 (20.8) 
 
Slightly Liberal (%) 95 (19.0) 
 
Neither Liberal nor 
Conservative (%) 76 (15.2) 
 
Slightly Conservative (%) 56 (11.2) 
 
Moderately Conservative 
(%) 47 (9.4) 
 
Extremely Conservative  
(%) 22 (4.4) 
   Political Ideology (Economic) Extremely Liberal (%) 68 (13.6) 
 
Moderately Liberal (%) 95 (19.0) 
 
Slightly Liberal (%) 81 (16.2) 
 
Neither Liberal nor 
Conservative (%) 90 (18.0) 
 
Slightly Conservative (%) 77 (15.4) 
 
Moderately Conservative 
(%) 57 (11.4) 
 
Extremely Conservative  
(%) 32 (6.4) 
   Participant Religious Affiliation Catholic (%) 112 (22.4) 
 
Protestant (%) 120 (24.0) 
 
Jewish (%) 15 (3.0) 
 
Latter-Day Saint (%) 7 (1.4) 
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Buddhist (%) 8 (1.6) 
 
Hindu (%) 4 (0.8) 
 
Islamic (%) 12 (2.4) 
 
Nontrinitarian (%) 1 (0.2) 
 
Other Religious 
Affiliation (%) 31 (6.2) 
 
I am religious or spiritual, 
but have no religious 
affiliation (%) 53 (10.6) 
 
I am not religious or 
spiritual and have no 
religious affiliation (%) 136 (27.1) 
   Participant Church Attendance 
Rate Never (%) 242 (48.3) 
 
A few times a year (%) 107 (21.4) 
 
More than a few times a 
year but less than once a 
month (%) 28 (5.6) 
 
1-3 times per month (%) 34 (6.8) 
 
Once a week (%) 67 (13.4) 
 
More than once a week 
(%) 16 (3.2) 
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Table 2 
 
Correlations between Key Study Variables 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Education Level 1.00 
      2. Church Attendance .13** 1.00 
     3. Scientific Merit -.03 -.001 1.00 
    4. Religiosity .04 .71** .006 1.00 
   5. Spirituality .03 .56** .05 .88** 1.00 
  6. Quest .09* .29** -.01 .49** .46** 1.00 
 7. Perceived Conflict -.004 -.12** .08 -.17** -.18** -.002 1.00 
 
Note: *p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 3 
 
Regression Coefficients for Exploratory Moderation Analyses: Religiosity, Spirituality, 
and Quest 
 
Variable B SEB p 
Constant 6.49 0.06 < .001 
Religious vs. Nonreligious Condition 
(0 = nonreligious, 1= religious) -0.32 0.12 .01 
Religiosity (mean centered) 0.003 0.05 .96 
Condition x Religiosity -0.05 0.1 .63 
    Constant 6.48 0.06 < .001 
Religious vs. Nonreligious Condition 
(0 = nonreligious, 1= religious) -0.027 0.11 .02 
Spirituality (mean centered) 0.02 0.02 .42 
Condition x Spirituality -0.01 0.04 .86 
    Constant 6.49 0.06 < .001 
Religious vs. Nonreligious Condition 
(0 = nonreligious, 1= religious) -0.23 0.11 .03 
Quest (mean centered) -0.02 0.04 .62 
Condition x Quest 0.04 0.07 .60 
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Table 4 
 
Regression Coefficients for Exploratory Moderation Analyses: Religiosity, Spirituality, 
and Quest 
 
Variable B SEB p 
Constant 6.49 0.06 < .001 
Religious vs. Nonreligious Condition 
(0 = nonreligious, 1= religious) -0.28 0.11 .015 
Education Level (mean centered) -0.07 0.05 .114 
Condition x Education Level 0.1 0.09 .257 
    Constant 6.49 0.06 < .001 
Religious vs. Nonreligious Condition 
(0 = nonreligious, 1= religious) -0.27 0.11 .211 
Perceived Conflict (mean centered) 0.04 0.03 .017 
Condition x Perceived Conflict -0.14 0.06 .018 
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Figure 1. Moderation of Effect of Religious Affiliation Condition on Perceived Scientific 
Merit by Level of Perceived Conflict between Religion and Science. 
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APPENDIX H 
 
FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2. Schwartz’s Human Values Model (from Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). 
